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Abstract
Although peer prediction markets are widely used in crowdsourcing to aggregate information from agents, they often
fail to reward the participating agents equitably. Honest agents can be wrongly penalized if randomly paired with dishon-
est ones. In this work, we introduce selective and cumulative fairness. We characterize a mechanism as fair if it satisfies
both notions and present FaRM, a representative mechanism we designed. FaRM is a Nash incentive mechanism that
focuses on information aggregation for spontaneous local activities which are accessible to a limited number of agents
without assuming any prior knowledge of the event. All the agents in the vicinity observe the same information. FaRM
uses (i) a report strength score to remove the risk of random pairing with dishonest reporters, (ii) a consistency score
to measure an agent’s history of accurate reports and distinguish valuable reports, (iii) a reliability score to estimate the
probability of an agent to collude with nearby agents and prevents agents from getting swayed, and (iv) a location robust-
ness score to filter agents who try to participate without being present in the considered setting. Together, report strength,
consistency, and reliability represent a fair reward given to agents based on their reports.
1 Introduction
Information aggregation systems have been employed to gather data for a wide variety of applications. A few examples
are pollution measurements in cities, product reviews on e-commerce websites, feedback on mobile applications on ap-
plication markets, working hours and other details of a business, etc. Depending on the type of the information of interest
and the available time for reporting, the devices that can collect the data and share them with the information aggregation
systems vary. The focus of this work is on location specific queries that need to be answered within a short time in the
so-called spontaneous localized settings. Such settings are challenging to handle since information regarding the query
subjects can only be collected by mobile agents that are located in an area and, possibly, by pre-deployed static sensors.
For example, consider a food deli serving various snacks to be the subject of interest and let the query be the availability
of a certain snack. Since the food deli is only relevant to the neighborhood and the queries can be very specific, Internet
services, like Neighbourly1, need to employ mobile agents.
In such scenarios, crowdsensing mechanisms can employ agents to collect information with spatiotemporal charac-
teristics. The main problem of aggregating information using crowdsensing mechanisms is to ensure that the agents are
truthful. A dishonest agent, for example, may have some grudge against an agency and therefore reports their service
as a lousy experience irrespective of the services of the agency. Agents can be categorized as honest, free-riders or mis-
behaving. Honest agents are expected to put effort into assessing the query subject and reporting truthful information.
Free-riders do not put effort into the assessment and try to earn free credits by guessing the information requested for the
subject. Misbehaving agents try to trick the mechanism by colluding among themselves and reporting false information.
Information aggregation mechanisms must be robust against free-riders and misbehaving agents. For that, they incorpo-
rate incentive mechanisms to engage agents to submit accurate reports. Rational agents target on maximizing their utility
(payments, reputation, etc.) while not sacrificing a substantial amount of resources (battery lifetime, dataplan usage, etc).
For traditional settings, there exist many popular peer prediction mechanisms inspired by the work of Prelec [2004],
who proposed the Bayesian Truth Serum and Miller et al. [2005], who developed Peer-to-Peer Prediction. These mech-
anisms rate an agent’s report against the report of another randomly selected agent and if they match, both agents are
rewarded based on the prior probability of their answer. Unfortunately, when considering spontaneous localized settings,
it is probable to not have readily available prior knowledge about the query subject. Also, there is a chance of matching
an honest agent with a misbehaving one, which results in an unfair evaluation. Although these mechanisms are Bayesian
1neighbourly.google.com/about
1
Incentive Compatible, they do not ensure fairness. Goel and Faltings [2019], recently proposed a fair mechanism for
information aggregation. However, they consider queries where the answers are known and hence, their mechanism is not
applicable to spontaneous localized settings.
In this paper, we focus on information aggregation in spontaneous localized settings and propose a suitable mech-
anism. Spontaneous localized settings describe information aggregation requests in local environments about subjects
which are accessible by only a small set of people. For example, the food deli scenario mentioned above, the queue
length in a local coffee shop, and others. Any query in these settings refers to a query subject (QS) and is valid only for
a bounded time. Also, there does not exist a prior distribution for the possible answers about QS. However, in these set-
tings, the observation environment is assumed to be the same for all the agents in the vicinity of QS. This is similar to the
output agreement (OA) setting where two agents observe the same signal and are scored based on the degree of similarity
in their reports. OA setting was first introduced by Von Ahn and Dabbish [2004, 2008] and later studied experimentally
by Robertson et al. [2009], and Huang and Fu [2012]. Waggoner and Chen [2014] were the first to provide a theoretical
analysis of the output agreement setting. We introduce spontaneous localized settings in more detail in Section 3.
We leverage on the characteristic of a common observation environment to propose the fair reward mechanism
(FaRM), a mechanism that incentivizes agents to report honestly, marginalizes free-riders and misbehaving agents and
ensures fairness in reward distribution without the need for a known prior distribution. FaRM is a novel Nash incentive
compatible mechanism for information aggregation in spontaneous localized settings. Additionally, we introduce the
notions of selective fairness and cumulative fairness. A mechanism satisfies selective fairness in cases where for two dif-
ferent agents that have submitted the same reports, they are evaluated similarly. Thus, all honest agents receive the same
reward if they submitted the same report. We propose report strength as one component of the reward scheme integrated
in FaRM to ensure selective fairness. Existing peer-prediction mechanisms consider every agent’s report equally valuable.
FaRM, in contrast to this assumption, considers more valuable the agents with long history of submitting truthful reports
compared to agents with lousy history of reporting due to their behavioral tendency to maintain the streak. Cumulative
fairness mandates that a fair mechanism should acknowledge an agent’s history of submission and consider her consis-
tency as part of final reward. We propose consistency score as the second component of FaRM’s reward scheme which
defines an agent’s consistency so far in the system and ensures cumulative fairness. This also helps FaRM minimize the
noise caused by false reports by considering the value of a report based on its reporter’s consistency. FaRM is designed
to ensure selective fairness and cumulative fairness.
Also, since spontaneous localized settings focus information aggregation related to local query subjects, many partic-
ipating agents will be located around the vicinity of the subject. Hence, it becomes imperative that the mechanism needs
to be collusion resistant. To ensure this, we propose the reliability score to estimate agents probability of collusion with
nearby agents. This score is designed to prevent the agents from colluding with nearby agents since it directly affects their
final reward. In summary, our contributions are:
1. FaRM is Nash incentive compatible mechanism that ensures truthful reporting from agents and guarantees non-
negative rewards to all agents (Theorem 4.15).
2. FaRM incorporates a payment scheme composed of: report strength, consistency score and reliability score.
3. FaRM uses report strength to ensure selective fairness by distributing the same immediate reward to all the agents
with the same report (Section 4.1).
4. FaRM employs consistency score as an estimate of agent’s consistency in the system so far. It gets updated after
each submission. It ensures cumulative fairness by rewarding the agent for her streak of honest submissions to the
system (Section 4.2).
5. FaRM integrates reliability score as an estimate of agent’s collusion with nearby agents (Section 4.3).
6. FaRM filters reports from agents who are not close to the query subject by incorporating a location robustness score
(Section 4.4).
2 Related Work
Information markets (IM), also known as prediction markets, are exchange-traded markets where agents with different
beliefs trade on the outcome of events. The market prices act as an estimate of the probability of the occurring of an
event. Therefore, prediction markets can be used to aggregate beliefs. Agents trade assets each of whose value is tied to a
particular observation. We discuss several proposals in information aggregation related to the design of FaRM.
In their seminal work, Miller et al. [2005] use an IM setting to elicit information from the agents. The asset, in
this case, was agents’ reports but the agents traded the reports with the system instead of other agents. This centralized
system is an automated market maker which ensures the availability of the market for trade. Agents are rewarded using
strictly proper scoring rules, which ascertain that the best response for each agent is to report truthfully. However, their
mechanism relies on the common knowledge assumption, which is not applicable in localized settings. Prelec [2004]
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Symbol Description Symbol Description
QS Query Subject A Set of agents participating in the process.
S Set of all the signals. s Observed signal by all agents.
ri Reported signal by agent i. ui Reward of agent i.
B Budget per crowdsensing query. li Context of a agent.
αi Consistency score of agent i. βi Reliability score of agent i.
γi Location robustness score of agent i. Ii Nearby agents (internal peers) of agent i.
Ei External peers of agent i. Φ() Strength function for a report type.
ϕ1 Strength of strongest report. ϕ2 Strength of second strongest report.
Table 1: Notation Table.
propose a mechanism which does not require knowledge of common prior information but is applicable on large number
of agents. Lambert and Shoham [2008] also propose a mechanism does not require common prior information but in the
equilibrium, agents are indifferent between being honest and misreporting.
Witkowski and Parkes [2011, 2012a] present mechanisms that do not assume any common prior information, do not
need a large number of agents to function and are robust to private beliefs of agents but suffer from temporal separation of
reports. Their improvedmechanism, named Robust Bayesian Truth Serum (RBTS) (Witkowski and Parkes [2012b]), does
not require temporal separation between two reports but works only for binary outcomes. Radanovic and Faltings [2013,
2014] improve RBTS to make it compatible with non-binary and continuous outcomes. Similarly, Zhang and Chen [2014]
propose a mechanism which does not assume prior known information. Riley [2014] presents a mechanismwhich is mini-
malistic (requires only one report) under the assumption that all the agents with the same outcome have the same posterior
expectations. A common characteristic among the aforementionedmechanisms is the use of Strictly Proper Scoring Rules
(SPSR) for distributing agents’ rewards. SPSR, however, do not guarantee fairness. The incentive compatible mechanism
by Jurca and Faltings [2003] is not employing a SPSR and is designed for interactive reputation markets. The weakness
of this mechanism is that it is susceptible to collusion and does not consider agents’ private beliefs. A new Robust version
by Jurca and Faltings [2007] of the earlier mechanism makes it robust against private beliefs of agents to some extent but
it assumes that common prior is known to the mechanism. Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013] also constructed a strong incentive
compatible mechanism but it can only be applied to binary settings. Faltings et al. [2014] proposePeer Truth Serum (PTS)
which is a minimalistic mechanism but assumes a prior belief model. Radanovic and Faltings [2015] improved PTS by
eliminating the dependency on prior belief model, they called it Logarithmic Peer Truth Serum (LPTS). LPTS assumes
that all agents observe same signal and therefore were able to come up with a minimalistic mechanism. Their mechanism
is able to tackle colluders and focuses on effort elicitation to prevent freeloading by agents. Radanovic et al. [2016] later
on propose an optimized version of PTS focusing on in multi-task settings.
FaRM, similarly to LPTS, assumes that all agents observe the same signal and does not require any common knowl-
edge assumptions. It is a minimalistic and collusion resistant mechanism that prevents free-riding and guarantees non-
negative rewards to the users.
3 Spontaneous Localized Settings
Existing mechanisms for information aggregation have been designed for the two following settings: (i) online reviews
about products and services, and (ii) community sensing regarding prevalent topics like pollution level reporting over
a wide region for a considerable duration of time. Additionally, to the best of our knowledge, existing literature on
information markets has not discussed information aggregation of location-specific spontaneous tasks on local subjects.
Most papers study an independent valuemodel where the agents can independently observe varying signals. In this model,
the truthful report of agents does not need to be the same. However, spontaneous localized settings follow a common value
model where all agents observe the same signal.
More formally, considering a query subject QS, a set of nearby agents A that choose to participate and asses QS,
and a budget B ∈ R, we want to estimate a function f . For example, QS can be a food deli and f the number of
eateries available for purchase. S denotes the signal space for the query and is allowed to be non-binary. Every query in
spontaneous localized settings focuses on only one task. The observation area is considered to be in the close vicinity of
the QS. Since the query requires to be answered spontaneously, we assume the QS to not change its status for the time
period the query remains active. Every agent i ∈ A observes the same signal s ∈ S and reports a signal ri ∈ S. ri can be
different to s. We define a general utility function for agent i as uˆi(ri, r−i) where ri represents agent i’s reported signal
and r−i (= (r1, ..., ri−1, ri+1, ..., r|A|)) represents all other agents’ reported signal. Note that we assume |A| ≥ 3, i.e. at
least 3 agents are participating for a particular query. Also, the sum of total utility (ui) of all agents should not exceed the
budget of the query i.e.
∑
ui
≤ B.
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4 FaRM: Fair Reward Mechanism
The payment scheme designed for FaRM is the product of three sub-utility functions, namely report strength, consistency
score and reliability score. The report strength is calculated at the end of every report collection process based on the
submitted reports. The consistency score is updated for each agent after every participation. For a new agent i, her
consistency score, (αi), is initialized to 0. FaRM also computes a reliability score for each agent which is an estimate of
an agent’s collusion with nearby agents. The consistency score motivates agents to participate and report truthfully while
the reliability score prevents agents from colluding with her neighboring agents. We discuss these metrics in Section 4.1,
Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 respectively where we analyze and prove that truthful reporting forms pure strategy Nash
equilibrium (PSNE) for each metric.
Definition 4.1 (Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium). Given a strategic form game Γ = 〈A, (Πi) : S → S, (uˆi)〉, the strategy
profile pi∗ = (pi∗1 , pi
∗
2 , ..., pi
∗
n) is called a PSNE of Γ if
pi∗i = argmaxpii∈Πi uˆi(pii, pi
∗
−i) ∀i ∈ N
That is, each player’s Nash equilibrium strategy is a best response to the Nash equilibrium strategies of the other play-
ers Narahari [2014].
Definition 4.2 (Nash Incentive Compatibility). A social choice function u : S1 × ... × Sn is said to be Nash Incentive
Compatible (or truthfully implementable in Nash equilibrium) if the direct revelation mechanismD = ((Si)i∈A, uˆ(.)) has
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium pi∗(.) = (pi∗1(.), ..., pi
∗
n(.)) in which pi
∗
i (si) = si∀si ∈ Si, ∀i ∈ A.
That is, directly asking the agents to report their types and using this information in uˆ(.) to get the social outcome will
solve both the problems, namely, preference elicitation and preference aggregation Narahari [2014] Garg et al. [2008a]
Garg et al. [2008b].
4.1 Report Strength
We define the strength of a report as the count of agents who have reported the same signal as agent i. If there is a wide
spectrum of possible signals, we discretize the range in buckets and consider two signals as equal, if they belong in the
same bucket. Report strength is the first of the three scores we compute for a report. It only depends on the current
performance of the agent and hence can be considered as the immediate reward for an agent in a particular query.
4.1.1 Computation of Report Strength
Every s ∈ S represents a report type and each report type receives certain number of reports. Let Φ be a function that
counts the number of reports of the same type. Φri is defined as the strength of agent i’s report by measuring how many
agents are in agreement with agent i.
Φ(ri) =
∑
j∈A
1ri=rj (1)
Φ(·) is a function on a generic report type and is independent of the agent. Thus, for computational efficiency, strength
score should be pre-computed for every signal which can be done by maintaining a counter for every signal while iterating
over all agent reports. That is for n agents, total computational complexity is O(n). Individual strength score for any
agent can then be obtained by just referring to the strength score of the corresponding signal reported.
Observation 4.3. The report strength of the report of an agent is always positive.
Proof. For any agent i, Φ(ri) compares ri with all the reports including ri itself, hence ensuring that the report strength
is at least 1.
i ∈ A ⇒ Φ(ri) ≥ 1
Lemma 4.4. Consider a game induced by uΦ where uΦ = Φ is the sub-utility function corresponding to the report
strength (Φ); and let sˆ be the observed signal by all agents and ri be the report submitted by any agent i. Then under
Nash equilibrium,
uΦi (ri = sˆ, r−i = sˆ) > u
Φ
i (ri 6= sˆ, r−i = sˆ)∀ri ∈ S, ∀i ∈ A
That is, if all other agents were to report truthfully, the best response for agent i in order to maximize her sub-utility uΦi
is also to report truthfully.
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Proof. Let sˆ be the observed signal by all agents and let ri be the reported signal of agent i. As per Nash equilibrium,
assuming every other agent reports honestly i.e. r−i = sˆ , the strength of agent i’s report is given by,
Φ(ri) = 1 + (|A| − 1)× 1ri=s
Consequently, sub-utility function uΦ can be written as,
uΦi (ri 6= sˆ, r−i = sˆ) = 1
uΦi (ri = sˆ, r−i = sˆ) = |A|
Hence, truthful reporting i.e. ri = sˆ is the best response for agent to maximize u
Φ
i when all other agents are also reporting
truthfully.
4.1.2 Selective Fairness
Information aggregation involves evaluating reported signals from agents. It is difficult to evaluate an agent since there
is no ground truth available in most scenarios. Existing peer prediction based mechanisms discussed in Section 2 rate an
agent’s report against the report of a random peer agent pi. This, however, exposes agent i to unfair evaluation because if
the peer agent pi is dishonest or misbehaving and submits false report, it will reflect in worse reward for agent i even if
she submits truthful report. Dwork et al. [2012] state that an algorithm is fair if it generates similar results for agents with
similar attributes. This is not possible with peer prediction based mechanisms.
Existing mechanisms in the literature mainly discuss settings which follow an independent-value model where agents
observe varying signals for the same query. This makes it difficult to rate all agents against equivalent reports. In our case,
we follow a common-value model where all agents observe the same signal. This makes it easier to rate all agents against
the same outcome.
Definition 4.5 (Selective Fairness). Let A be a set of agents in the vicinity of subject QS and agents i, j ∈ A be any two
arbitrary agents who submit two identical reports ri and rj such that ri = rj . The utility function of a payment scheme
u˜, admits selective fairness if,
u˜i(ri, r−i) = u˜j(rj , r−j), ∀i, j ∈ A
Claim 4.6. Report strength is a selectively fair computation score for agents.
Proof. Strength Φ(.) is a function of a generic report type (i.e. signal) and for a generic signal s, it is given as,
Φ(s) =
∑
j∈A
1s=rj (2)
Hence, by construction, agents with similar report will share similar strength score and so Φ is selectively fair.
4.2 Consistency Score (α)
The report of an agent with a history of reporting truthfully is more valuable to FaRM than the report of an agent with a
lousy history of reporting. Therefore, instead of distributing rewards based only on the performance of agents in the last
query, we keep a metric of every agent’s performance so far in the mechanism and take it into consideration while paying
the agents. We call this metric consistency score.
Consistency score depends on the strength of agent i’s report. After every report of agent i, the FaRM updates agent’s
consistency score. The score increases for accurate reporting and gets penalized for inaccurate reporting. It should be
noted, however, that the accuracy is relative since the ground truth is not known and the highest reported signal is used as
a proxy for ground truth. Consistent agents receive higher rewards than less consistent ones for the same report submitted
to the system because of the higher value of their report. We, therefore, motivate agents to maintain the quality of their
reports in order to maintain high rewards. This also encourages agents who have a higher rate of submitting truthful
reports to the system to continue participating and at the same time discourages free-riders and dishonest reporters.
4.2.1 Computation of Consistency Score
The consistency score is incremented with respect to the second highest reported signal (denoted by φ2) and is decre-
mented based on the highest reported signal (denoted by φ1).
ϕ1 = max
s∈S
(Φ(s)) (3)
ϕ2 =


max2s∈S(Φ(s)) if max2s∈S(Φ(s)) > 0
ϕ2
1
−1
ϕ1
if max2s∈S(Φ(s)) = 0
(4)
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where max 2 gives the second highest value and ϕ1 ≥ ϕ2 > 0. ϕ1 and ϕ2 can be pre-computed before computing
individual agent scores. For n agents, the complexity is O(n). Only agents with the strongest reports will have their
consistency score incremented. However, it is not enough to submit one of the strongest reports, the report type must
hold percentage strictly greater than other report types. Other agents will have their consistency score decremented. It is
updated as follows,
αti =


αt−1i −
αt−1
i
k ×
(ϕ1−Φ(ri))
|A| if Φ(ri) < ϕ1
αt−1i +
1−αt−1
i
k ×
(ϕ1−ϕ2)
|A| if Φ(ri) = ϕ1,
(5)
where k ≥ 1. Note that k is just an arbitrary constant which can be used to tweak the reward rate. t represents the
sequence of rounds agent i has participated. Once ϕ1 and ϕ2 are pre-computed, updating α has constant computational
complexity per agent (i.e., the overall complexity is O(n)).
Claim 4.7. Consistency score is bounded in the range [0,1).
Proof. Consistency score for any agent is initialized at 0. The score remains 0 until the agent report coincides with the
highest reported signal for the first time. Let
αt−1i ∈ [0, 1) (6)
Case 1: Φ(ri) < ϕ1
αti = α
t−1
i (1−
ϕ1 − Φ(ri)
|A|
) (7)
Also, we know the following,
Φ(ri) < ϕ1 < |A| (8)
k ≥ 1 (9)
(10)
Using Equations (6), (8) and (9) in Equation (7), we get,
αti ≥ 0 (11)
αti < α
t−1
i < 1 (12)
Case 2: Φ(ri) = ϕ1
αti = α
t−1
i +
1− αt−1i
k
×
(ϕ1 − ϕ2)
|A|
(13)
Let a = ϕ1−ϕ2k|A| and we already know the following,
0 < ϕ2 ≤ ϕ1 ≤ |A| (14)
k ≥ 1 (15)
From Equations (14) and (15), we can say
a ∈ [0, 1) (16)
We now rewrite Equation (13) as,
αti = α
t−1
i + (1− α
t−1
i ) · a (17)
Using Equations (6) and (16) in Equation (16), we can say,
αti ≥ α
t−1
i ≥ 0 (18)
αti < 1 (19)
From Equations (11), (12), (18) and (19), we prove our claim that α(·) ∈ [0, 1)
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Notice that the consistency score increases rapidly when it is closer to zero and it decreases fast when it is closer to
one. This property motivates new agents to join the system and prevent existing agents from downgrading the quality of
their reports.
Lemma 4.8. Consider a game induced by uα where uα = α is the sub-utility function corresponding to consistency score
(α); and let sˆ be the observed signal by all agents and ri be the report submitted by any agent i. Then considering the
property of Nash equilibrium,
uαi (ri = sˆ, r−i = sˆ) > u
α
i (ri 6= sˆ, r−i = sˆ)∀ri ∈ S, ∀i ∈ A
That is, if all other agents were to report truthfully, the best response for agent i in order to maximize her sub-utility uαi is
also to report truthfully.
Proof. Let sˆ be the observed signal by all agents and let ri be the reported signal by agent i. We assume every other agent
to report truthfully as per Nash equilibrium, i.e. r−i = sˆ. Then, ϕ1 and ϕ2 are given as,
ϕ1 = |A| − 1ri 6=s
ϕ2 =
{
1 if ri 6= s
|A|2−1
|A| if ri = s
Using above simplifications, we derive simplified consistency score for agent i as,
αti =


αt−1i −
αt−1
i
k ×
(|A|−2)
|A| if ri 6= s
αt−1i +
1−αt−1
i
k ×
(1/|A|)
|A| if ri = s
Consequently, the sub-utility function uαi can be written as,
uαi (ri 6= sˆ, r−i = sˆ) = α
t−1
i −
αt−1i
k
×
(|A| − 2)
|A|
uαi (ri = sˆ, r−i = sˆ) = α
t−1
i +
1− αt−1i
k
×
(1/|A|)
|A|
Given |A| ≥ 3 and αt−1 ∈ [0, 1) (from Claim 4.7),
uαi (ri = sˆ, r−i = sˆ) > u
α
i (ri 6= sˆ, r−i = sˆ)
Hence, truthful reporting i.e. ri = sˆ is the best response for agent to maximize u
α
i when all other agents are also reporting
truthfully.
4.2.2 Cumulative Fairness
Report from an agent who is consistently reporting truthful information is more valuable than the report of an agent with
a lousy history of reporting.
Example: In her summer vacation, Anna joins professional cooking classes out of interest. She likes to frequently
practice recipes at home and get reviews from her family and neighbors. Once she makes Turkish delights and has Barbara
and Chris independently assess the delicacy. However, they submit contrasting reviews. But Anna recalls Barbara’s
previous reports and finds her to be misreporting on various occasions in order to make her happy, while Chris has been
almost always critical but truthful in his reports. Thus, based on the history of reports of Barbara and Chris, Anna identifies
Chris’ reports to be more useful than that from Barbara.
It’s only fair to take the value of an agent’s report into consideration while distributing reward. Motivated by similar
analogy, we incorporated consistency score (α) in our final reward structure.
Definition 4.9 (Cumulative Fairness). Let A be a set of agents in the vicinity of local subject QS and agents i, j ∈ A
be any two arbitrary agents submitting report ri and rj such that ri = rj . Then the utility function uˆ(.) of an arbitrary
payment scheme is said to admit cumulative fairness if,
uˆti(ri = sˆ, r−i, uˆ
t−1
i ) > uˆ
t
j(rj = sˆ, r−j , uˆ
t−1
j )
∀i, j ∈ A s.t. uˆt−1i > uˆ
t−1
j
Claim 4.10. Consistency score is a cumulatively fair computation score for agents.
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Proof. Let A be a set of agents in the vicinity of local subject QS and agents i, j ∈ A be any two arbitrary agents
submitting report ri and rj such that ri = rj and α
t−1
i > α
t−1
j .
Since there reports are same and strength (Φ(.)) is a selectively fair computation score (from Claim 4.6), we can say,
Φ(ri) = Φ(rj).
Case 1: Φ(ri = rj) < ϕ1
αti = α
t−1
i −
αt−1i
k
×
(ϕ1 − Φ(ri))
|A|
αtj = α
t−1
j −
αt−1j
k
×
(ϕ1 − Φ(rj))
|A|
Let a1 =
(ϕ1−Φ(ri))
|A| =
(ϕ1−Φ(rj))
|A| .
Then, we can rewrite αi, αj as,
αti = α
t−1
i (1−
a1
k
) (20)
αtj = α
t−1
j (1−
a1
k
) (21)
Also, we know the following:
Φ(ri = rj) < ϕ1 < |A| ⇒ a1 < 1 (22)
k ≥ 1 (23)
αt−1i > α
t−1
j (24)
Using Equations (22) to (24) in Equations (20) and (21), we get,
αti > α
t
j (25)
Case 2: Φ(ri = rj) = ϕ1
αti = α
t−1
i +
1− αt−1i
k
×
(ϕ1 − ϕ2)
|A|
αtj = α
t−1
j +
1− αt−1j
k
×
(ϕ1 − ϕ2)
|A|
Let a2 =
(ϕ1−ϕ2)
|A| .
Then, we can rewrite αi, αj as,
αti = α
t−1
i (1−
a2
k
) +
a2
k
(26)
αtj = α
t−1
j (1−
a2
k
) +
a2
k
(27)
Also, we know the following:
0 < ϕ2 ≤ ϕ1 ≤ |A| ⇒ a2 < 1 (28)
k ≥ 1 (29)
αt−1i > α
t−1
j (30)
Using Equations (28) to (30) in Equations (26) and (27), we get,
αti > α
t
j (31)
From Equations (25) and (31) and Definition 4.9, we say that consistency score admits cumulative fairness.
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4.3 Reliability Score (β)
Reliability score provides incentives to agent i to not collude with her nearby agents Ii. It is defined as the ratio of
external agreement by internal agreement. The internal agreement is the percentage of nearby agents (formally identified
as internal peers Ii) that share the same report as agent i and the external agreement is the percentage of agents other than
nearby agents (formally addressed as external peers Ei) who share the same report as agent i.
Definition 4.11 (Internal and External Peers). The internal peers of agent i (denoted by Ii) are the ones with which i
can exchange a message using a device-to-device communication protocol like Wi-Fi direct or Bluetooth. The internal
peers combined with the agent’s location compose her context li. Every agent j that is not directly accessible from i (i.e.,
j /∈ Ii) belongs to her external peers denoted by Ei.
4.3.1 Computation of Reliability Score
For agent i, her reliability score is computed as:
βi =
(
∑
j∈Ei
1ri=rj )
|Ei|
(
∑
j∈Ii
1ri=rj )
|Ii|
+ 1
(32)
For n agents, the computational complexity for calculating β is O(n) per agent.
Claim 4.12. Reliability score is bounded in the range [0,1)
Proof. Let
b1 = (
∑
j∈Ei
1ri=rj ) / |Ei| (33)
b2 =

(∑
j∈Ii
1ri=rj ) / |Ii|

+ 1 (34)
By construction, b1 ∈ [0, 1] and b2 ∈ [1, 2]
Hence, βi =
b1
b2
∈ [0, 1]
Lemma 4.13. Consider a game induced by uβ where uβ = β is the sub-utility function corresponding to reliability score
(β); and let sˆ be the observed signal by all agents and ri be the report submitted by any agent i. Then considering the
property of Nash equilibrium,
uβi (ri = sˆ, r−i = sˆ) > u
β
i (ri 6= sˆ, r−i = sˆ)∀ri ∈ S, ∀i ∈ A
That is, if all other agents were to report truthfully, the best response for agent i, in order to maximize her sub-utility uβi ,
is also to report truthfully.
Proof. Let sˆ be the signal observed by all agents and ri be the reported signal of agent i. We assume every other agent to
report truthfully as per Nash equilibrium. Then, the reliability score for agent i’s report can be simplified as,
βi =
1ri=sˆ
1ri=sˆ + 1
= 0.5× 1ri=sˆ
Hence, agent i maximizes her reliability score by reporting truthfully, i.e. ri = sˆ.
Claim 4.14. Reliability score prevents agents from colluding with nearby agents.
Proof Sketch. Reliability score (β) can be seen as,
β =
external agreement
internal agreement+ 1
where external agreement is the percentage of the external peers that agree with the agent and internal agreement is the
percentage of the internal peers that agree with the agent. For the sake of convenience we use variables li and gi as,
li = internal agreement =
1
|Ii|
∑
j∈Ii
1ri=rj
gi = external agreement =
1
|Ei|
∑
j∈Ei
1ri=rj
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Let’s consider a malicious colluding agentm. We assume agents aroundQS are reasonably scattered and that the majority
of agents are honest. In that case, agent m will have high internal agreement and less external agreement i.e. lm > gm.
Since, βm ∝ gm and βm ∝ 1/(lm + 1), the more agent m colludes with internal peers the lower her reliability score
drops. In case where nearby agents are also honest, it is still in favor of agent m to submit truthful report since she will
want to maintain her reporting agreement with external peers.
On the other hand, if agentm were to be honest while her internal peers collude, the outcome is lm < gm. This leads
to increase in reliability score. Hence, if internal peers of agent m are colluding, it is profitable for agent m to remain
honest. Thus, reliability score prevents agents from getting swayed by nearby agents (internal peers).
4.4 Location Robustness Score (γ)
Apart from the aforementioned scores, we introduce the location robustness score of agent i, γi, to detect whether the
location of a mobile agent is close to the location of the query subject. Every mobile agent can exchange messages with
her internal peers in order to justify that she is within a distance from the query subject Chatzopoulos et al. [2016]. In
detail, considering that the context of agent i, li is composed of her location l
Loc
i and her nearby agents Ii, agent i can
send a message to every node j ∈ Ii with l
Loc
i in it using a communication technology like Bluetooth or WiFi-direct.
Every agent j ∈ Ii will calculate the distance with agent i,Dji and will respond to the message by including her location
lLocj and the calculated distance. Agent j can sign her message with a private key in order to make sure that agent i will
not alternate her estimation of the difference between the two locations. Based on these messages, agent i will calculate
the robustness of her location.
γi =
1
|Ii|
∑
j∈Ii
1Dji≤DT (35)
Which is practically the fraction of their neighbors who are within a distance DT that depends on the communication
technology. For example, two mobile agents can communicate with Bluetooth if DT < 20 meters and with WiFi-direct
if DT < 50 meters. Depending on the query subject and the predetermined allowed distance from which a mobile agent
can produce a report, DT may be smaller than the values achieved by the employed communication technology. FaRM
uses location robustness to detect fraudulent agents.
Every participating mobile agent, has to submit γi together with her report. Given that a fraudulent agent is not able
to alternate γi, since every message from her internal peers is signed, FaRM filters reports with low γ values.
4.5 Rewards
Once FaRM filters reports using the location robustness score, it updates consistency and reliability scores for each agent,
then finally it calculates every agent’s reward for that query. The location robustness score (γ) is only used for filtration
and not considered in the final reward. The final reward of agent i depends on the product of Φ(ri), αi and βi. The
strength of agent’s report factors in the immediate reward for the respective query. The consistency score takes into
account agent’s tendency to report truthfully and therefore motivate a more consistent agent to participate more. The
reliability score keeps the agent from colluding with other agents. An agent who has a history of colluding with nearby
agents will have less motivation to participate in the system, hence preventing noise generated by misleading reports. The
final utility score (ui) is computed as:
ui(ri, r−i) =
uΦi (ri, r−i) . u
α
i (ri, r−i) . u
β
i (ri, r−i)
|A|
2 ×B, (36)
where B is the reward budget per query. Also, since final utility is the product of all three scores, even if some closely
located agents collude in order to increase report strength, they risk decreasing reliability score which can mask the
benefits of collusion and result in even worse payoffs.
Theorem 4.15. FaRM is Nash incentive compatible with guaranteed non-negative payoffs and weak budget balanced.
Proof. Let sˆ be the signal observed by all agents and ri be the reported signal of agent i. We assume all other agents to
report truthfully as per Nash equilibrium i.e. r−i = sˆ.
Let
wi(ri, r−i) = u
Φ
i (ri, r−i) . u
α
i (ri, r−i) . u
β
i (ri, r−i)
and
W−i(ri, r−i) =
∑
j∈A\i
wj(rj , r−j),
then we can rewrite ui as:
ui =
wi
|A|
2 ×B
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For a fixed budget B and |A| number of agents participating,
argmaxri(ui)⇒ argmaxri(wi)
Also, wi can be written for Nash equilibrium case as,
wi(ri 6= sˆ, r−i = sˆ) =u
Φ
i (ri 6= sˆ, r−i = sˆ) .
uαi (ri 6= sˆ, r−i = sˆ) . u
β
i (ri 6= sˆ, r−i = sˆ)
wi(ri = sˆ, r−i = sˆ) =u
Φ
i (ri = sˆ, r−i = sˆ) .
uαi (ri = sˆ, r−i = sˆ) . u
β
i (ri = sˆ, r−i = sˆ)
Using Lemmas 4.4, 4.8 and 4.13, we can say wi(ri = sˆ, r−i = sˆ) > wi(ri 6= sˆ, r−isˆ)
Hence, agent i gains maximum utility when she reports truthfully i.e. ri = s.
Also since,Φ(ri) > 0 (fromObservation 4.3), αi ∈ [0, 1) (Claim 4.7), βi ∈ [0, 1] (Claim 4.12), we can say (wi ≥ 0⇒
ui ≥ 0) ∀A, irrespective of them reporting truthfully. For truthful reporting in Nash equilibrium, FaRM guarantees strictly
positive payoffs which can be easily verified. Hence, FaRM guarantees non-negative utilities for all agents, however, an
agent must report truthfully to maximize her utility and maintain her consistency score. This motivates agents to report
truthfully but at the same time protects them from loss in case of reporting error.
Furthermore,
Φ(ri) ∈ [1, |A|]⇒ u
Φ
i ∈ [1, |A|]
αi ∈ [0, 1)⇒ u
α
i ∈ [0, 1)
βi ∈ [0, 1]⇒ u
β
i ∈ [0, 1]
From above three equations,maxri(wi) < |A|. Consequently,
maxri(ui) <
B
|A|
And hence, in any case scenario it is not possible for the total reward of |A| agents to exceed budget B. Thus, FaRM is
weak budget balanced.
Proposition 4.16. FaRM admits selective fairness and cumulative fairness and hence is a fair mechanism.
Proof. From Claim 4.6, we show FaRM admits selective fairness for immediate query. Also, from Claim 4.10, we show
that FaRM ensures agents are accounted for their consistency and valuable reports. Hence, we conclude FaRM to be a
fair mechanism.
5 Conclusion
Existing information aggregation mechanisms are focused on settings relevant to mass population, e.g., online reviews
about products and services, and community sensing regarding prevalent societal topics (pollution, global warming, etc.).
FaRM focuses on location-specific queries of people in their everyday life. It can be challenging to obtain prior distribu-
tion models for the signal space and hence, prior-free mechanisms are preferable for these set of queries. In spontaneous
localized settings all the agents are assumed to observe the same signal. FaRM leverages this property to provide fair
rewards to all agents. FaRM’s payment scheme consists of three sub-utility structures, namely report strength, consis-
tency score and reliability score. Report strength ensures selective fairness for the immediate query by evaluating all
agents equivalently against the same result. Consistency score ensures cumulative fairness by accounting for an agent’s
consistency in the system. The report of an agent consistently reporting truthful reports to the system is more valuable
than the report of an agent with a lousy reporting history. Consistency score takes the value of a report into consideration.
Therefore, it helps in preventing agents from free-riding as it can affect their consistency score negatively. Reliability
score estimates an agent’s collusion with the nearby agents and reflects the same in the final reward. It motivates agents
to earn a higher reward by not colluding with nearby agents and instead stick with their observed signal. Together these
scores ensure fair reward to the agents, not just for their immediate contribution but also for their consistent and reliable
service to the system. In summary, FaRM is a Nash incentive compatible mechanism which rewards agents fairly for their
services.
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